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number of weeks represented and entitlement to unemployment benefit was 
off-set accordingly. 
The change in policy r~sults from a review undertaken by the Social Security 
Commission. From 1 October 1 980 redundam.:y payments will not be set-off 
against entitlement to unemployment benefit. Janet Scott 
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This title was drawn from the punch line in one of those Irish stories which 
still creep into local publications despite the Human Rights Commission. 
Paddy's query on arriving at the bus stop (the writer argues) seems to sum-
marise much current concern about industrial relations. 
AGITATORS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
A widespread view is that many of New Zealand's industrial ills can be traced 
to the presence of a few agitators. The Sofinsky Ca$e notwithstanding, such a 
view cannot go unchallenged. It is hard to conceive how 1 50 (or even 1 500) 
people can upset New Zealand's democratic, egalitarian society unless that 
society is far from well. The writer consequently is not alone in drawing atten-
tion to the comments of the industrial relations adviser in the Prime Minister's 
Department. Dr Turkington writes: 
"There are a number of difficulties with the 'agitator argument'. First, 
whether one labels a person an agitator depends very much on one's view of 
the nature of the enterprise. Management may regard leaders of workers in 
conflict situations as 'agitators', while the workMs themselves may regard 
them as anything but. Second, and aside from the problem of definition, the 
argument fails to explain how a few 'militants' can infiltrate otherwise 
peaceful groups of workers and lead them into conflict action. In other 
words, it does not adequately explain why agitators exist in the industry and 
why th€y are apparently successful."' 
Later in the same work, in a very careful analysis of the multiplicity of causes of 
conflict in the meat freezing industry, on major construction sites and on the 
wharves, Dr Turkington comments: 
"It seems the 'agitator argument' has minimal exp•anatory value by com-
parison with more basic factors. " 2 
Experts have long pointed to certain facts about industrial conflict. Some en-
vironments are particularly prone to conflict (e .g. motor assembly plants and 
meat freezing). Others are relatively peaceful (e.g. banking and retailing). The 
environment, however, need not be the deciding factor in determining whether 
or not open conflict occurs. The capacity of the parties to handle the inherent 
conflict in an employment relationship is generally much more important. Even 
a stoppage-ridden industry can still have enterprises which are rarely (if ever) 
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involved in disputes. 3 The inference would seem to be that joint problem solv-
ing is a key industrial relations skill. Joint problem solving, however, presup-
poses that those involved are able and willing to work their way through some 
prAtty difficult issues to achieve mutual accommodation . 
Jomt problem solving is very evident in some European approaches to worker 
participation in management (e.g. co-determination in West Germany and shop 
floor democracy in Sweden). In each case it is associated with a very 
sophisticated approach to negotiating industrial matters. A similar foundation 
is lacking in this country. The highly controlled form of industrial negotiation 
practised here, in the writer's view, inhibits innovation in industrial relations. 
This is likely to be a substantial obstacle to the improved industrial relations 
essential to restructuring our economy. 
PROPERLY DEVELOPED INDUSTRIAL NEGOTIATION 
The average person seems to think of industrial negotiation in terms of wage 
fixing and the control of stoppages. Properly developed industrial negotiation 
extends beyond this. It is essentially a 'political ' relationship turning on the ex-
ercise of power, authority and influence. It follows that industrial negotiation 
cannot take place between an employer and individual workers. It must be a 
relationship between organisations (and for that reason should be more proper-
ly called collective bargaining) . Here the exercise of power becomes important. 
Unless each party faces the ultimate possibility of industrial action by the other 
there is little pressure for agreement. 
What is involved in collective bargaining is a process of accommodation bet-
ween employers and trade unions. This has been described "as a way of 
organising divergent Interests in such a way as to resolve rather than extend 
open conflict". • As such it involves more than negotiating a collective agree-
ment (or an award). That agreement is effectively a peace treaty for a fixed 
period . No treaty, however, is worth the paper on which it is written unless it is 
properly enforced. Consequently, the process of industrial negotiation does not 
end with the signmg of a collective agreement . It shifts from negotiation to day-
to-day administration and interpretation of the agreement . That is essentially 
workplace activity and workplace activity which builds up the capacity for 
more sophisticated types of joint problem solving . 
What has just been described is a much more open approach to industrial 
negotiation than that formally practised in New Zealand. Could it work here? 
Would its adoption merely add to what some people already regard as unaccep-
tably high levels of industrial conflict? No one can give firm and absolutely une-
quivocal answers to these questions. There is no industrialised country in 
which stoppages and wildcat actions never occur. There are nonetheless a 
number of industrialised countries whose standing in 'the stoppage league" 
shows a much better performance than New Zealand . Their experience does 
point to a common core of good industrial relations practice with the potential 
to transform collective bargaining . From a clash between warring factions it 
can become a tough but positive problem solving exercise involving the parties 
and, where necessary , government. Polarisation , distrust, and outright bad 
faith can be made to give way to tough, but fair-minded negotiation based on 
good faith. 
3 The Turkington study (p. 2171 g1ves an example of th1s. In the meat freezmg 1ndustry between 1967 and 1973 four of the 
works were mvolved m only two stoppages each over the whole period. A total of 14 works averaged less than one stoppaQe 
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GOOD FAITH IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The concept of good faith is quite crucial here. It has obvious ethical roots 
way back in Western civilization, but has a rather specific meaning in industrial 
relations practice . Broadly speaking it means acceptance of the other party and 
willingness to abide by established procedures in industrial negotiation . In more 
detail it means willingness to meet the other party with an open mind at 
reasonable times; willingness to study the other party's arguments and to ad-
mit merit in them where it exists; willingness to disclose all relevant informa-
tion; willingness to safeguard confidentiality; willingness to accept "give and 
take" in order to reach a solution fair to both sides; and willingness to honour 
agreements reached and to accept a referee on points of interpretation and ap-
plication . Good faith in industrial relations also requires mutual respect even 
when expressing conflicting points of view . All this requires the parties to 
forego short term advantages which can only create distrust and polarised at-
titudes. Some examples drawn from close to home may illustrate why good 
faith is important: 
• a trade union negotiated a new industrial agreement with employers in an in-
dustry . Within two weeks of signing the agreement, it brought pressure to bear 
on one of the employers to pay a higher rate. Without consulting the other 
employers , this employer conceded the higher rate . Both union and employer 
acted in bad faith and created widespread distrust throughout the industry. 
• pressure of work in a certain organisation led to a gradual breakdown of 
established communications and disputes procedures . Eventually a dispute 
arose concerning the application of an award provision to a particular 
employee . Initially the employer refused to meet with local trade union 
representat ives and their national officials to discuss the matter. As the dispute 
hotted up , he attempted to meet the local representatives but not the national 
officials . When he eventually conceded the initial claim, he still faced a greater 
conflict as he sought to avoid discussions with the national officials. 
• a trade union sought to compel an employer to hire its members to the exclu-
sion of other workers who would have qualified for at least some of the work 
involved . It attempted to avoid the statutory prohibition on such behaviour by 
applying muscle to the employer's supervisors. They were "requested" to hire 
only persons who produced written evidence of union membership . 
Each of these illustrations contains two elements which work against joint 
problem solving in an atmosphere of good faith : an overbearing attitude 
towards the apparently weaker party and failure or refusal to comply with pro-
cedures laid down by the community or dictated by common sense . Unfor-
tunately such behaviour is sufficiently widespread to set at risk the efforts of 
many people who are currently trying to improve the climate of industrial rela-
tions . Furthermore, unless such behaviour can be changed, the possibility of 
coping with both inflation and the restructuring of the economy is ques-
tionable. 
One of the principal beliefs of democratic society is that undesirable condi-
tions can be removed by legislation. The establishment of community stan-
dards by statute is seen as the route to improved human behaviour. Practical 
experience shows that this is not always true. Legal rules can only be effective 
60 
in democracies when they have substantial comun1ty support. Racism and sex-
ism, for example, may be outlawed by statute, but they will certainly not disap-
pear without patient education and experience of their irrelevance. It is the pro-
cess of education and experience which reformulate community standards and 
not the passage of a law . If an issue is relatively simple, the processes of educa-
tion, experience and legislation may be relatively fast (even occuring almost 
simultaneously) . With complex issues, like many industrial relations problems, 
the matter is not so easily resolved . There is a degree of over-kill as legislators 
seek to enforce rules which are out of step with relevant sections of public opi-
nion . 
A good example of this type of over-k ill lies in the recent controversy over 
compulsory unionism. Vocal public opinion seemed to politicians, and even to 
some uncommitted observers, to favour abandonment of unqualified 
preference . Ballots taken after the statute had been amended showed how 
wide of the mark this was. 6 Much the same, in the writer's opinion, is true of 
the massive intrusion of penalties into industrial law in recent years . They are 
ineffective because the parties involved view them as largely irrelevant. 
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
What has this got to do with earlier comments about joint problem solving 
and negotiation in good faith? Here the study of comparative industrial rela-
tions, industrial relations in different countries, can be instructive . Certain prin-
ciples and practices appear with remarkable regularity where industrial rela-
tions is not regarded as a running sore : 
• it is accepted that mutual recognition is essential if the parties are to develop an 
orderly, stable relationship. This may be done on a voluntary basis (as in the 
Swiss Peace Agreement or the Norwegian Basic Agreement) or it may be en-
forced through state intervention (through certification in the United States and 
Canada) ; 
Registration in New Zealand certainly embodies the principle under discussion 
here. The European and North American practices just mentioned develop it in 
more detail with procedures and/or extensive tests to demonstrate the good 
faith of the parties involved . 
• it is accepted that the parties themselves, not the la w-makers, should determine 
what constitutes industrial matters even if on occasions this results in a stoppage. 
This permits the parties to ta ilor their relationship to suit the infinite variety of 
technological , economic and cultural constraints found in particular 
workplaces even within the same industry . Sometimes this approach is 
modified slightly in the interests of orderly relationships . The central organisa-
tions of the parties may agree to standard rules for handling disputes 
throu!=-1-lout industry (Scandinavia) . Alternatively the state may require every 
collecu -.te agreement to include a grievance procedure (Canada) . These 
modifications, however, do not depart from the general principle that industrial 
matters should be determined by the parties themselves . 
In New Zealand, industrial matters are, of course, narrowly defined by statute 
and judicial interpretation. The advantage of the less restrictive overseas ap-
proaches, to the writer, lies in the fact that they encourage the parties to 
develop a vested interest in the non-legal aspects of their relationship . This 
5 The voung pattern 1nd1cated that the overwhelm1ng maJonty o f employees w1shed to reta 1n unqualtfled pre ference 
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shifts the emphasis in negotiation towards joint problem solving of practical 
issues. 
• it is accepted that mutual recognition and freedom to determine industrial matters 
carry with them certain obligations towards the community. Every effort must be 
made to minimise stoppages over unresolved disputes of interest. Stoppages 
over an alleged breach of collective agreement (or its interpretation) must not 
take place . 
In this whole area there are a variety of approaches. Unresolved disputes of in-
terest may generally be left to settlement through a stoppage provided the par-
ties meet their statutory obligation to negotiate in good faith (the United 
States). Alternatively, varying degrees of voluntary or obligatory mediation 
may be employed to achieve a settlement (Canada, Scandinavia and 
Switzerland). In the case of disputes of right, by way of contrast, unresolved 
issues are invaribly settled by some form of enforceable adjudication. This ex-
perience contrasts markedly with New Zealand where something like 7 5% of 
stoppages are in breach of agreement and involve disputes of right. 6 
The principles and practices just reviewed are tied together by a common 
thread . They are seen by the parties involved as acceptable and relevant to 
their relationship . They meet standards of fairness and practicality which are 
crucial in industrial relations. No realist can expect the parties involved in in-
dustrial relations to see eye-to-eye. In some cases they will actively dislike each 
other. In others, experience can teach them to respect and even admire each 
other without surrendering their own principles. In the latter situation they can 
reach a shared understanding (but not shared objectives) about the realities of 
industrial relations . They become "professionals". 
This theme of professionalism does seem to be surfacing more frequently in 
discussions of New Zealand's industrial climate . The New Zealand Economist, 
for example, recently stressed that the legal framework is only part of the pro-
blem . It concluded a discussion of "the behavioural framework" of industrial 
relations thus : 
"There is no law that will ensure good industrial relations. And you cannot 
legislate against arms length relationships and bad manners.'' 7 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 1980S 
Those words highlight some of the industrial relations problems likely to be 
encountered as the economy is restructured in the 1 980s. Recruiting and train-
ing people to build and operate the new energy projects are likely to strain the 
community's imagination and facilities. They may well be made much more dif-
ficult because of the sensitivity of relativities and continuing attempts at cen-
tralised wage fixing. And those issues in turn may be further complicated by 
the need to encourage some selective immigration in the face of continuing 
unemployment. On top of all this come the challenges and fears raised by the 
micro-processor and other new technologies. 
Do these problems mean that the industrial climate of the 1 980s must in-
evitably be one of conflict and frustration? Provided the community is prepared 
6 In part th•s s•tuat•on spnngs from the statutory aetmttlons of diSputes ot mterest and disputes of ught . They are so draned as to 
preclude the easy resolution of matters ansing dunng the currency of a collective agreement or an award. Amencan, Scandtna-
vtan and Sw•ss practtces cover thts parttcular oroblem 
New Zealand EconomiSI, Apnl 1980, pp 12 and 43 
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to think in terms of social innovation, the outcome could be totally different and 
overwhelmmgly positive. The development of New Zealand forms of joint pro-
blem solving and negotiation in good faith could help create such an at-
mosphere. It could have a greater impact upon the industrial community than 
the early years of industrial conciliation and arbitration. 
In the last decade, there have been national and international debates on in-
dustrial democracy and the quality of working life. There has been considerable 
&sagreement about concepts and objectives, but theorists and practitioners do 
seem to agree about one matter. Commitment to creating a better working en-
vironment and more imaginative job design can (but will not necessarily) improve 
industrial attitudes. Where success has been achieved, it has required the type 
of joint problem solving discussed here. This has transcended national boun-
daries and negotiating structures (be they industrywide or enterprise specific). 
The approach too snows signs of growth in New Zealand. The New Zealand 
Employers Federation's concern for employee involvement points to a signifi-
cant shift towards these concepts. The case studies published by the Federa-
tion raise many of the issues and problems encountered overseas, but more im-
portantly point to "home grown" solutions. 
THREE GUIDELINES 
The importance of home grown solutions cannot be emphasised too strong-
ly. Restructuring the economy and coping with new technologies cannot be left 
to overseas experts or slavish copying of overseas models. The country has to 
live with the solutions and thus has to find realistic solutions relating to the 
world in which it lives. In this respect, three guidelines may be suggested for 
use in developing industrial relations policies and practices in the 1980s : 
• agreed solutions for restructuring the economy and the introduction of new 
technologies are in the long term interests of all New Zealanders. The potential for 
conflict lies in short term problems. 
The interests of the community and the new or innovating enterprises may 
clash with the expectations of those whose livelihood and jobs are threatened. 
Agreement on the phased introduction of change consequently seems vital to 
minimise human costs and gain acceptance of new ways. 
• "investment in adaptation" needs to be encouraged throughout the community. 
A positive response 1s likely if people can see advantage in responding to 
change. Policies encouraging adjustment to change thus need to anticipate 
rather than follow events. 
• the costs and benefits of restructuring the economy and using new technology are 
likely to accrue to different groups of people. The community and the new or in-
novating enterprises gain. Those who are displaced lose. The costs to the losers 
ought to be deducted from the benefits to those who gain. 
The readjustment package8 recently announced for workers adversely affected 
by the textile industry plan is an example of this type of policy. Its narrowness 
(in the sense of being industry specific) and its timing nonetheless raise ques-
tions about optimum effectiveness. This writer, personally, is in favour of more 
broadly based anticipatory active employment pc..licy. 
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In developing these guidelines, no reference has yet been made to wages 
policy . this has been quite deliberate . It is argued that the institutional founda-
tion of industrial relations (its organisation, the structure and attitudes of the 
parties) must first be accepted as relevant and fair. Until that is the case, the 
development of an acceptable wages policy is likely to be no more than "exhor-
tation in a vacuum". 
The guidelines just advanced are designed to assist in adjusting to changed 
circumstances . The overall objective of adjustment is the improved well-being 
of the community as a whole. As this is achieved, the political problem of 
distributing the gains will become very apparent. Who gets what share (con-
sumers, producers and the state)? That distributional problem is, however, t~ 
already present . Failure to resolve it is likely to limit the possible gains from a m 
restructured economy and intelligent use of the new technologies. "i 
It is hard to see how the distributional problem can be resolved without con- p1 
siderable social innovation . Improved productivity on the scale required calls 
for something more than massive investment (and consequent restraint on con- d! 
sumption) . T he capital equipment involved must be used effectively by people w 
who understand what they are doing and who are committed to their tasks . nc 
Th is is essentially a workplace issue involving joint problem solving. It also re- sc 
quires attention to appropriate incentives and margins for skill. Here the poten- de 
tial for a clash between the need for innovation and traditional attitudes is 
severe . Its resolution is likely to require a close look at what the community. 
means by " egalitarianism " 
CONCLUSION 
It would be useful to have the benefit of hindsight from the year 201 0 . As 
that is not possible, one can only guess at the verdict of history . At the mo-
ment, New Zealand is probably completing its movement into modern industrial 
society . The shift from pastoral colony to modern industrial state will have 
been completed in less than an average life-time. Current conflicts and strains 
over attitudes and traditions are thus to be expected . There is nevertheless a 
great advantage in being a late-comer to the industrial stakes. Observation of 
the experience of other runners can provide significant pointers about tracks to 
follow and obstacles to avoid . 
The lessons of comparative industrial relations point to the importance of en-
couraging the parties t o solve their own problems in good faith . This is reinforc-
ed by national and international experience in "employee involvement". The 
role of the state in industrial relations may consequently have to shift from 
detailed regulation into two other areas : the encouragement of industrial self-
government and greater involvement in adjustment (economic and 
technological change) . This would need to be accompanied by a widening of 
the scope of industrial negotiation and close attention to the observance of col-
lective agreements (and awards) . Such a change need not dismantle our tradi-
tional approach to industrial relations but it would modify it in the light of the 
needs of the late 20th century . Those needs include community acceptance of 
the fa.ct that the motivation to work involves something more than a monetary 
exerc1se. Employees have (and should be encouraged to have) interests in their 
workplace beyond the pay packet. 
All this is easily said but not so easily achieved . The danger lies in not attemp-
ting to meet the challenge - in arriving at the bus stop after the next bus has 
gone . 
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